

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W
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P R 111205Z NOV 73
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7329
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KHARTOUM 2430

DEPT PASS CAIRO

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, SU
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION: SUDANESE VIEWS

BEGIN SUMMARY: ASSTSEC NEWSOM, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
AND AF/N DIRECTOR BLAKE, CALLED ON PRESIDENT NIMEIRI NOV. 10
TO DESCRIBE US INVOLVEMENT MIDDLE EAST AND US OBJECTIVES.
ACTING FONMIN AL-HAJ MUSA AND FONOFF UNDERSEC FADL OBEID
ALSO PRESENT. NEWSOM STRESSED US EFFORTS TOWARD CEASE FIRE
AND DETERMINATION UTILIZE PRESENT SITUATION TO SEEK JUST AND
LASTING PEACE IN MIDDLE EAST. EXPRESSED HOPE THAT GOS AND
OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WOULD SHOW PATIENCE DURING LONG AND
DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LIE AHEAD. NEWSOM ALSO
EMPHASIZED SERIOUS PROBLEM CONTINUATION OIL BOYCOTT COULD
POSE FOR US ACTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SEARCH FOR MIDDLE EAST
SOLUTION. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION US EFFORTS FOR
CEASE FIRE AND HOPE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WOULD NOW FINALLY
BE SETTLED. COMMENTED THAT UNITL VERY RECENTLY HE HAD NOT
BEEN CONTACTED BY ANY ARAB HEAD OF STATE RE MIDDLE EAST
WAR AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS. NIMEIRI EXPRESSED
SUDANESE CONCERN WITH ADVERSE IMPACT ON OIL EMBARGE ON
NATIONAL ECONOMY. ALTHOUGH NIMEIRI DESCRIBED GOS MIDDLE
EAST POLICY IN STANDARD ARAB TERMS HE REFLECTED WILLINGNESS
TO HAVE SUDAN PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ARAB AND AFRICAN
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COUNCILS. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER EXCHANGE OF AMENITIES, ASST. SEC NEWSOM
EXPLAINED REASON FOR HIS VISIT SUDAN, EMPHASIZING GREAT

IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHED TO HAVING OTHER GOVERNMENTS FULLY UNDERSTAND US OBJECTIVES AND US INVOLVEMENT IN CURRENT MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. NEWSOM EMPHASIZED NO MILITARY UNITS OF US HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE WAR, US HAD ONLY BEGUN RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL AFTER MAUVIVE SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO ARABS BECAME EVIDENT AND THAT US WAS COMMITTED TO SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE ISRAEL BUT NOT TO ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. HOWEVER, US COULD NOT RPT NOT STAND IDLY BY DURING WAR IF EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL THREATENED.

2. NEWSOM NOTED THAT ONCE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BEGAN US HAD TWO OBJECTIVES: (A) CEASE FIRE, AND (B) MOVEMENT TOWARD

JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. US BELIEVES RECENT WAR HAD CREATED SITUATION DIFFERENT FROM 1967. ARABS HAD RECOVERED THEIR HONOR, ISRAELIS HAD LEARNED THAT MILITARY SUPERIORITY COULD NOT ENSURE THEIR CONTINUED PEACEFUL EXISTENCE, AND DETENTE NOW EXISTS BETWEEN US AND USSR WHICH WAS NOT CASE IN 1967. FINALLY, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338 HAD ESTABLISHED BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH CONFLICT.

3. LOOKING AHEAD, US SAW THREE KEY PROBLEMS. FIRST IS OIL EMBARGO IMPOSED BY ARAB STATES AGAINST US. IF EMBARGO CONTINUED IT COULD BE ITS IMPACT POLITICALLY IN US HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON EFFORTS OF PRESIDENT AND SECSTATE TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. SECOND PROBLEM WAS NEED TO GIVE PARTIES IN UPCOMING NEGOTIATIONS MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY, AND NOT RPT NOT HAVE THEM BOUND BY RESOLUTIONS IN ARAB SUMMIT OR OAU WHICH WOULD MAKE ATTEMPTS OF EGYPT, JORDAN AND SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE MORE DIFFICULT. NEWSOM REMINDED NIMEIRI OF HOW DIFFICULT LATTER'S OWN NEGOTIATIONS WITH SUDANESE SOUTHERNERS HAD BEEN, AGD NEED AT THAT TIME OF AVOIDING AT OUTSET RIGID POSITIONS WHICH WOULD HAVE MADE PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT IMPOSSIBLE. THIRD CONSIDERATION WAS US RECOGNITION THAT PALESTINIAN FACTOR IN PROBLEM MUST BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS LEADING
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TO SETTLEMENT MUST BEGIN AMONG GOVERNMENTS WITH DOOR LEFT OPEN FOR PALESTINIANS AT APPROPRIATE TIME.

4. IN REPLY, NIMEIRI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF US EFFORTS WHICH HAD RESULTED IN CEASE FIRE. HE STATED THAT UNTIL LAST 48 HOURS NO RPT NO ARAB HEAD OF STATE HAD CONTACTED SUDAN RE MIDDLE EAST. AT OUTBREAK OF WAR NIMEIRI HAD CALLED SADAT TO WISH HIM SUCCESS AND TO OFFER SUDANESE ASSISTANCE. HOWEVER, SINCE WAR BEGAN SUDANESE HAD BEEN DEPENDENT FOR THEIR INFORMATION ON MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS ON FACT SUDAN MEMBER UNSC, ON THEIR UN PERMREP, AND ON THEIR MISSIONS IN ARAB AND OTHER WORLD CAPITALS.

5. NIMEIRI STATED THAT HE FIRST THOUGHT WAR WAS RESULT OF COLLUSION BETWEEN US AND SOVIET UNION TO FORCE MIDDLE EAST ANTAGONISTS INTO SETTLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. HE HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER US MIGHT HAVE COOPERATED WITH ARAB STATES TO FORCE ISRAEL TO GIVE UP OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, OR WHETHER WAR WAS RESULT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN SYRIA, EGYPT AND JORDAN. FINALLY, HE HAD ALSO WONDERED WHETHER SOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN ARMS TO THE ARABS AS ENCOURAGEMENT TO BEGIN WAR WHICH WOULD LEAD TO FAST VICTORY. NIMEIRI INDICATED THAT GOS HAD SUPPORTED ARAB CAUSE IN RECENT CONFLICT BECAUSE OF COMMITMENTS MADE AFTER 1967 WAR. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT LIKE IDEA OF SENDING "SYMBOLIC" TROOPS IF ONLY BECAUSE ISRAEL HAD CLAIMED AFTER 1967 WAR THAT IT HAD DEFEATED "13 ARAB COUNTRIES" WHICH CERTAINLY WAS NOT THE CASE INASMUCH AS SUDAN HAD NOT BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED. CONCLUDING, NIMEIRI STATED SUDANESE POLICY IN FOLLOWING TERMS: OPPOSITION TO RETENTION BY ANY GOVERNMENT OF TERRITORIES WON BY FORCE; NEED TO CORRECT SITUATION WHICH HAD EXILED PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FROM THEIR HOMELAND; AND FINALLY, NEED TO END ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF MOSLEM HOLY PLACES.

6. RE OIL EMBARGE NIMEIRI STATED GOS DID NOT KNOW WHAT OIL WAS USED AS WEAPON BY ARABS AND WHO WAS THE BENEFICIARY OF THIS POLICY, ESPECIALLY WHEN USE OF OIL AS WEAPON HAD BEEN REJECTED BEFORE THE WAR. IN HIS JUDGMENT, THE OUTCOME OF THE RECENT CONFLICT INsofar AS ARABS ARE CONCERNED HAD NOT RESULTED IN ANY MILITARY VICTORY. BEFORE
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THE WAR THE ARAB POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SITUATION HAD BEEN BETTER AS HAD BEEN THE ARAB MORAL POSITION. SUDAN HAD FAVORED A CEASE FIRE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECAUSE OF THE GREAT RISK OF AN CONFRONTATION LEADING TO WAR BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS WHICH "ONLY THE ARABS WOULD LOSE", EVEN THOUGH AT THE TIME HE, NIMEIRI, BELIEVED THAT THE WAR WAS THE RESULT OF SUPER POWER COLLUSION. (WHEN NEWSOM ASKED WHETHER NIMEIRI STILL BELIEVED THIS TO BE THE CASE, HE SMILED AND LAUGHED.)
BREWER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7330
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KHARTOUM 2430

DEPT PASS CAIRO

EXDIS

7. NEWSOM RECALLED HOW SECRETARY HAD LEARNED OF
LIKELIHOOD HOSTILITIES ONLY FEW HOURS BEFORE OUTBREAK.
NEITHER US NOR ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ACCURATELY
FORECAST OUTBREAK. NEVERTHELESS, US REGARDED PRESENT
SITUATION AS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD JUST AND
LASTING SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM. NIMEIRI REPLIED THAT GOS
APPRECIATED EFFORTS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER WHICH HAD
RESULTED IN CEASE FIRE AND THE COOPERATION OF THE SUPER
POWERS WHICH IT HAD SUPPORTED. HE STRESSED THAT NOBODY
IN PRESENT SITUATION WOULD SPEAK FOR GOS EXCEPT GOS
ITSELF AND THAT USG SHOULD IGNORE STATEMENTS CLAIMING
TO REPRESENT "VIEWS OF ALL ARAB NATIONS". UNLESS GOS
IDENTIFICATION WITH THEM WAS CLEAR.

8. REVERTING TO OIL EMBARGO, NEWSOM RECALLED COMMENTS
OF OAU DESECEN ONU IN ADDIS THAT EMBARGO FOR AFRICAN
STATES MIGHT WELL BE "TWO-EDGED SWORD". NIMEIRI AGREED AND
NOTED THAT SUDAN HAD ONLY THREE DAY SUPPLY OF OIL ON HAND
AND SUFFERED SERIOUS FINANCIAL LOSSES AS RESULT OF INCREASE
IN OIL PRICES TRIGGERED BY ARAB STATES BUT FOLLOWED BY
IRAN, WHICH IS SUDAN'S SUPPLIER.

9. NEWSOM EXPRESSED HOPE SUDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES
WOULD HAVE PATIENCE IN COMING WEEKS AND MONTHS DURING
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WHICH ATTEMPTS WEERE BEING MADE TO WORUUOUT SOLUTION IN
MIDDLE EAST. NIMEIR HAD REFERRED TO RISK OF CONFRONTATION
OF SUPER POWERS. USG IS WELL AARE OF THAT RISK AND
DANGER OF ACCIDENTS OCCURING WHICH NEITHER WE NOR SOVIET
UNION WOULD WANT; HENCE OUR CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT IN
QUEST FOR SOLUTION TO MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. FINALLY,
NEWSOM STRESSED THAT US, BECAUSE OF ITS CONTACTS WITH
BOTH ISRELIS AND ARABS, IS INDISPENSABLE IF PEACE IS TO
BE ESTABLISHED. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OTHERS WILL

NOT HAVE ROLE TO PLAY AND US WILL CONTINUE TO UTILIZE UN
IN ITS EFFORTS.

10. CONCLUDING THIS PART OF CONVERSATION, NIMEIRI
EMPHASIZED SUDAN WILLINGNESS TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE
IN SEARCH FOR JUST AND DURABLE PEACE AND STRESSED GOS
COULD BE HELPFUL IN BOTH ARAB AND AFRICAN WORLD. NEWSOM
SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC SUGGESTION BUT HOPED FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES LIKE SUDAN WOULD PLAY MODERATING ROLE AT
OAU FONMINS AND ARAB SUMMIT MEETINGS, LEST
UNHELPFUL EMOTIONAL APPEALS DOMINATE PROCEEDINGS. NEWSOM
ALSO ASSURED NIMEIRI THAT US WOULD CONTINUE TO KEEP GOS
INFORMED THROUGH AMBASSADOR.
BREWER

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

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